The paper proposes a generic consensus algorithm that highlights the basic and common features of known consen sus algorithms. The parameters of the generic algorithm encapsulate the core diff erences between various consensus algorithms, including leader-based and leader-free algo rithms, addressing benign faults, authenticated Byzantine faults and Byzantine faults. This leads to the identification of three classes of consensus algorithms. With the proposed classification, Paxos and PBFT indeed belong to the same class, while FaB Paxos belongs to a diff erent class. Interest ingly, the classification allowed us to identify a new Byzan tine consensus algorithm that requires n > 4b, where b is the maximum number of Byzantine processes.
Introduction
Consensus is a fundamental and difficult problem in fault tolerant distributed computing. This explains the numerous consensus algorithms that have been published, with dif ferent features and for different fault models. Considering these numerous algorithms, it would be helpful to classify them, in order to identify the basic mechanisms on which they rely. This would allow a better understanding of con sensus algorithms, particularly for a classification encom passing benign faults and malicious (Byzantine) faults.
The paper provides such a classification by proposing a generic consensus algorithm, which highlights the basic and common features of known consensus algorithms. The pa rameters of the generic algorithm encapsulate the core dif ferences between various consensus algorithms, including leader-based and leader-free algorithms, addressing benign faults, authenticated Byzantine faults and Byzantine faults. Instantiations of the parameters allow us to obtain these var ious algorithms. The generic algorithm also allows us to discuss randomized consensus algorithms.
The generic algorithm consists of successive phases, where each phase is composed of three rounds: a selection 978-1-4244-7501-8/10/$26.00 ©201O IEEE round, a validation round and a decision round. The val idation round may be skipped by some algorithms, which introduces a first dichotomy among consensus algorithms: those that require the validation round, and the others for which the validation round is not necessary. We further sub divide the former class in two, based on the state variables required. This lead us to identify three classes of consen sus algorithms, and tradeoffs between these classes. With this classification, Paxos [11] (benign faults) and PBFT [4] (Byzantine faults) indeed belong to the same class, while FaB Paxos [16] belongs to a different class. Interestingly, the classification allowed us to identify a new Byzantine consensus algorithm that requires n > 4b (inbetween the requirement n > 5b of FaB Paxos and n > 3b of PBFT). 1 Our generic algorithm is based on four parameters: the FLV function, the Selector function, the threshold param eter TD , and the flag FLAG (* or ¢). The functions FLV and Selector are characterized by abstract properties; TD is defined with respect to n (number of processes), f (max imum number of benign faults) and b (maximum number of Byzantine processes). We can prove correctness of the generic consensus algorithm by referring only to the ab stract properties of our parameters. The correctness proof of any specific instantiated consensus algorithm consists simply in proving that the instantiations satisfy the abstract properties of the corresponding functions.
The paper is not the first one to propose a generic con sensus algorithm, but it goes beyond previous approaches. Mostefaoui et al. [18] propose a consensus framework re stricted to benign faults, which allows unification of leader oracle, random oracle and failure detector oracle. Guer raoui and Raynal [9] propose a generic consensus algo rithm, where generality is encapsulated in a function called Lambda. The Lambda function encapsulates both our se lection and our validation rounds. This does not allow the authors of [9] to identify the differences between two of our three classes of consensus algorithms. Moreover, as for [18] , the paper is restricted to benign faults. Later, Guer rraoui and Raynal [10] propose a generic version of Paxos in which communication (using shared memory, storage area networks, message passing channels or active disks) is en capsulated in the Omega abstraction. The paper is also re stricted to benign faults. Apart from this work, several other authors proposed abstractions related to Paxos-like proto cols, e.g., [13] and [14] . Recently, Song et al. [20] proposed building blocks that allow the construction of consensus al gorithms. They consider both benign and Byzantine faults. However, they ignore some seminal consensus algorithms such as PBFT and FaB Paxos, and their framework there fore has a somehow limited scope.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the system model and to definitions. Section 3 introduces the generic consensus algorithm and its param eters. Section 4 presents three classes of instantiations for these parameters, and classifies consensus algorithms such as Paxos, FaB Paxos, PBFT into these classes. Section 5 gives examples of instantiations of the generic algorithm. In Section 6 we show how the generic algorithm can be adapted to include randomized consensus algorithms, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
Model and Definitions

System Model
We consider a variant of a partially synchronous sys tem [7] : we assume that the system alternates between good periods (during which the system is synchronous) and bad periods (during which the system is asynchronous). We differentiate honest processes that execute algorithms faith fully, from Byzantine processes [12] , that exhibit arbitrary behavior. Honest processes can be correct or faulty. An honest process is faulty if it eventually crashes, and is cor rect otherwise. Among the n processes in our system, we assume at most b Byzantine processes and at most f faulty (honest) processes. The set of all processes is denoted by II, the set of honest processes by 1{ and the set of correct processes by C.
Round Model. Distributed algorithms can be expressed as a sequence of rounds. In each round r, a process p sends a message to a subset of processes according to a "sending" function S;, and at the end of this round, computes a new state according to a "transition" function T; that takes as input the vector of messages it received at round r and its current state. Note that this implies that a message sent in round r can only be received in round r (rounds are closed).
Honest processes cannot be impersonated: if an honest process receives v from p in round r, and p is honest, then p sent v in round r. The state of process p in round r is de noted by s;; the message sent by an honest2 process is de- Communication Predicates. During good periods of our partially synchronous system, we assume the following two communication predicates that are sufficient to solve con sensus: P g ood and Peo n s. The predicate P g ood ensures that correct processes receive every message sent by a correct process:
An implementation of P g ood on top of the basic par tially synchronous system model with benign and Byzan tine faults has been proposed in [7] .
The predicate Peo n s provides the same guarantees as the predicate P g ood, but additionally ensures that each correct process receives the same set of messages. In the benign fault model (Le., b = 0), this predicate can be implemented using the implementation of P g ood described in [7] if we as sume that no crash occurs in good periods. In the Byzantine fault model (i.e., b -=I=-0), several implementations of Peo n s
Peo n s(r) == P g ood(r) 1\ V p, q E C: J1; = � Based on these definitions, we define the notion of a good phase. A phase is a sequence of rounds. A good phase ¢ of k rounds is defined as a phase such that Peo n s holds in the first round, and P g ood holds in the remaining k -1 rounds.
Unifying Byzantine Faults
Two different models for Byzantine faults have been considered in literature [7] : (1) authenticated Byzantine faults, where messages can be signed by the sending pro cess (with the assumption that signatures cannot be forged by any other process), and (2) Byzantine faults, where there is no mechanism for signatures (but the receiver of a mes sage knows the identity of the sender). 3
As shown in [17] , the predicate Peo n s allows the uni fication of these two fault models: (i) Peo n s allows us to express a generic consensus algorithm that is the same for both fault models, and (ii) Peo n s can be implemented out of P g ood in the two fault models. The implementation in the authenticated Byzantine fault model is simpler and requires two rounds; three rounds are needed in the Byzantine fault model. To summarize, the predicate Peo n s allows us to de scribe consensus algorithms without making difference be tween authenticated Byzantine faults and Byzantine faults. Therefore, in the paper we use the term Byzantine faults for both fault models, except if explicitly mentioned.
sense.
3 In [12] , these models are respectively called (1) Byzantine faults with signed messages, and (2) Byzantine faults with oral messages.
The Consensus Problem
In the consensus problem, each process starts with a given initial value, and later possibly decides on a value. The problem is specified by the following properties:
• Agreement: No two honest processes decide differently;
• Termination: All correct processes eventually decide;
• Validity: If all processes are honest and if an honest pro cess decides v, then v is the initial value of some process;
• Unanimity [20] : If all honest processes have the same ini tial value v and an honest process decides, then it decides v. Unanimity (which extends validity) is optional, and only makes sense with Byzantine processes.
Locked Value. In the context of a consensus algorithm, we refer below to the notion of locked value. 4 This notion has similarities with the notion of univalent configuration de fined in [8] , but is actually different (see below). A value v is locked in round r if:
1. An honest process has decided v in round r' < r, or 2. All honest processes have the same initial value v.
Item 2 is meaningful only if unanimity must be ensured, or if all processes are honest. In all other cases, item 2 can be ignored. From this definition it follows that, if v is locked in the context of a consensus algorithm then the configura tion is v-valent. However, the opposite is not true (e.g., if a configuration is v-valent in round r, and the first honest process p decides v in round r' 2': r, then v is not locked in round r, but only in round r' + 1 > r).
A Generic Consensus Algorithm
We now present a generic algorithm (see Algorithm 1), from which well-known consensus algorithms can be in stantiated (see Section 5). Generality is obtained by parametrization of Algorithm 1: parameters appear in a box.
Generic Algorithm
The generic Algorithm 1 consists of a sequence of phases that can be seen as successive trials to decide on a value. Each phase ¢ consists of three rounds, respec tively called selection round (r = 3¢ -2), validation round (r = 3¢ -1), and decision round (r = 3¢). We will see that some values of the parameters allow us to skip the val idation round. We first describe process states, and then the three rounds. The Selection Round (r = 3¢ -2). The selection round has two roles. First, it allows processes to elect a set of processes, called validators, that have a special role in the next validation round. The election is based on the proposal of each process, which is locally returned by the function Selector(p, ¢). The function Selector(p, ¢) outputs a set of processes S � II and is formally defined in Section 3.2.
The second role of the selection round is for validators to select a value that will be considered for the decision. The selection is implemented by the function FLV(�) (stands for " Find the Locked Value"), where � is the set of messages (votep, tsp, historyp, -) received in the selec tion round. When a value v is locked, no value v' -I=-v can be returned by FLV(�). On the other hand, if any value can be selected, then FLV(�) may return 7. If no enough information is provided to FLV(�) (which may occur, for instance, if a validator does not receive any message during a selection round), then null is returned. A formal defini tion of FLV(�) can be found in Section 3.2.
The selection round is executed as follows. Each pro cess p first sends its state and the set S of processes output by function Selector(p, ¢) to the processes in S (line 7) . Based on the set of messages received, each honest process selects a value (line 9). If any value can be selected (Le., FLV (�) returns 7), the selected value is deterministically chosen among � (lines 10-11). When a value has been se lected (i.e., selectedp -I=-null), process p sets its vote to the selected value, and logs the selected value in the history (lines [12] [13] [14] . At the end of the selection round the set of validators for the next round is elected. Line 15 guarantees that all honest processes that consider a non-empty set of validators, have the same set of validators.
For termination, the selection round must ensure that all correct validators have selected the same value. This is en-5 Bounding the size of the variable historyp requires an additional round of communication. More details can be found in [3] . 14: The Validation Round (r = 3¢-1). The role of this round is for every honest process p to determine which value se lected by validators in the selection round is a valid value. Among all honest processes, at most one value may be con sidered to be valid. The validation round is executed as follows. Each val idator first sends the value selected in the selection round together with the set of validators (line 19) . Then, each 6p cons is defined in [17] for rounds in which all processes send to all processes. We assume here variant of P cons that does not require all-to-all message exchange. The adaptation is trivial. all votes are considered. In the latter case, the validation round can be suppressed. As a consequence, variables tsp and historyp are no more necessary. Moreover, the set Selector(p, ¢) does not need to be sent at line 7, and line 15 can be suppressed.
Optimization: The decision round of phase ¢ can be exe cuted concurrently with the selection round of phase ¢ + 1.
Parameters
We identify two categories of parameters. The first cat egory is related to the decision round, and contains the pa rameters TD and FLAG. As shown in Section 4, these two parameters influence the properties of the instantiated algorithm (i.e., n, process state, and number of rounds per phase). The second category contains the functions Selector(p, ¢) and FLV(iI;) which define the selection and the validation rounds.
FLAG:
The parameter FLAG defines which votes are taken into account in the decision round: all votes (if FLAG = * ), or only the votes that are valid in the current phase (if FLAG = ¢). In the former case, the validation round can be suppressed. TD: The parameter TD defines the number of identical votes that is required to decide. To ensure termination, the votes of faulty (honest) and Byzantine processes must not be required to decide. Hence, TD :::; n -b -f. and v -=I-null, then v E {vote: (vote, -, -) E iI;}.
Selector(p,
• FLV -agreement: If value v is locked in round r, only v or null can be returned.
• FLV -liveness: If Vq E C : iI; [q] -=I-..l, then null cannot be returned.
Correctness of the Generic Algorithm
Correctness of our generic alogrithm is based on the fol lowing two lemmas from which Theorem 1 can be proved. All proofs can be found in [19] . We present now instantiations of the functions FLV and Selector. We identify three instantiations of FLV func tion. The first instantiation uses only the variable votep, the second uses the variables votep and tsp, and the last one uses all three variables votep, tsp and historyp. This leads to three classes of consensus algorithms, as shown in Ta ble 1. Algorithms that belong to the same class have the same values for the parameters FLAG and TD. Therefore algorithms from the same class have the same constraint on n (follows from n � TD + b + f) and have the same num ber of rounds (follows from the value of FLAG, see Section
3.2).
One can observe a tradeoff among these three classes. For instance, when FLAG = *, TD > n +3;+f, only two rounds per phase are needed and the process state is the OneThirdRule [6] (b = 0) FaB Paxos [16] (I -0)
smallest, but it requires the largest n (n > 5b + 3f). The "Examples" column of Table 1 shows which known algo rithms correspond to a given class. These examples are dis cussed in Section 5. We can make the following comments. First, if b = 0 (benign faults), classes 2 and 3 are identical, since historyp can be ignored with benign faults. Therefore Paxos and CT 9, which belong to class 2, also trivially belong to class 3, case b = O. Second, to the best of our knowledge, no existing algorithm corresponds to the class 2 for the case 1 = 0 (Byzantine faults). We call this new algorithm MQB (Masking Quorum Byzantine consensus algorithm). l0 Fi nally, Table 1 shows that despite its name, the FaB Paxos algorithm does not belong to the same class as the Paxos algorithm.
We now present the three instantiations of the F L V func tion that lead to the three classes of consensus algorithms. Instantiations of the Selector function are discussed later.
Instantiations of FLV(JI;)
We give here the intuition of the instantiations. The proofs that the properties defined in Section 3.2 hold can be found in [19] .
4.1.1
FLV(JI;) for class 1
We start the discussion with the FLV function for class 1 (FLAG = * and TD > n +;Hf), see Algorithm 2.
Line 1 is for FLV -agreement. We now explain its role with a simple example. Let Vl be locked in round r. For simplicity, let us reason only on the following case: some honest process p has decided Vl in round r -1. By Algo rithm 1, p has received in the decision round r -1 at least TD votes Vl. At least TD -b votes Vl are from honest processes, i.e., at most n -(TD -b) processes have votep 9 CT refers to the Chandra-Toueg consensus algorithm with the failure detector OS.
JO The quorums used in this algorithm satisfy the property of masking quorums [IS] . Note that with respect to the definitions in [ return null equal to V 2 i-Vl (*). Therefore, the condition of line 1 can only hold for VI, i.e., among the values different from ? and null, FLV can only return VI. For FLV-agreement to hold, Algorithm 3 must also prevent? to be returned when VI is locked. The condition of line 4 ensures this. Here is why. Assume that the condition of line 4 holds. This means that JI; contains more than 2(n -TD + b) messages. With (*), any set of more than 2(n -TD + b) messages con tains more than n -TD + b messages equal to VI (this is illustrated in Figure 1 with the case n = 6, b = 1, 1 = 0 and TD = 5). By line 1, we have VI E correctVotesp, and as explained above, only Vl can be in correctVotesp. Therefore, the condition of line 2 holds: Algorithm 2 cannot return? when VI is locked.
> 2(n -TD+ b) Figure 1 . Illustration for FLV for class 1 (n = 6,
Property FLV-liveness is ensured by lines 4, 5. This is because when T D > n +;H f, we have n -b -1 > 2(n -TD + b). Therefore, receiving a message from all correct processes (i.e., IJI;I 2: n -b -f) implies that the condition of line 4 holds. Property FLV -validity is ensured by lines 1-3. Because only one value can be validated by honest pro cesses in phase ¢il (see Lemma 2), all honest processes with votep = V2 #-VI have tsp < ¢il' It follows that for every honest process p, we have votep = VI or tsp < ¢il (**).
Together with (*), no message (V2 #-VI, -, -, -) sent by an honest process can satisfy the condition of line 1. In other words, the set possibleVotesp may contain at most b messages (V2 #-VI, -, -, -), i.e., the messages sent by Byzantine processes. Line 2 prevents such messages to be in correctVotesp. This shows that among the values dif ferent from? and null, only VI can be returned. For FLV -agreement to hold, Algorithm 3 must also pre vents? to be returned when VI is locked. The condition of 978-1-4244-7501-8/101$26.00 ©2010 IEEE line 5 ensures this. Here is why. Assume that the condi tion of line 5 holds. This means that fI';, contains more than n -T D + 2b messages. With (*), the set fI';, contains at least b + 1 messages (VI, ¢iI, -, -) from honest processes (this is illustrated in Figure 2 for the case n = 5, b = 1, f = 0, TD = 4). With (**) and the fact that fI';, contains more than n -TD + b messages from honest processes (see Figure 2) , the b + 1 messages (VI, ¢iI, -, -) satisfy the condition of line 1. By line 2, (VI, ¢iI, -, -) is in correct Votesp. More over, as discussed above, only VI can be in correctVotesp. Therefore, the condition of line 3 holds: Algorithm 3 cannot return ? when VI is locked.
Property FLV-liveness is ensured by lines 5, 6. This is because when TD > 3b + f, we have n -b -f > n -TD + 2b. Therefore, receiving a message from all cor rect processes (i.e., 1fI';, I � n -b -f) ensures that the con dition of line 5 holds. Property FLV -validity is ensured by lines 1-4.
4.1.3
FLV(fI';,) for class 3
The FLV function for class 3 (FLAG = ¢i and TD > 2b + f) is shown in Algorithm 4. Observe that for instantiations of class 3, TD can be � 3b + f. Therefore, detecting the locked value only based on votes and timestamps, as done by Algorithm 3, does not work. Therefore, an additional mechanism is needed: the history log. ifthere is a value v such that it;; contains a majority of messages (v, -,-) return null Similarly to Algorithm 3, lines 1 and 2 are for FLV agreement. Their role can be explained with a simple ex ample. Consider that value VI is locked in round r that be longs to phase ¢il + 1. For simplicity, let us first assume that some honest process p has decided VI in round r -1 that be longs to phase ¢il' Consider Figure 3 . For the same reason as for Algorithm 3, at least TD -b honest processes have votep = VI and tsp = ¢il (*), i.e., at most n -TD honest processes have votep = V2 #-VI. Furthermore, for every honest process p, we have votep = VI or tsp < ¢il (**). To-gether with (*), no message (V2 -I-Vi, -, -, -) sent by an honest process can satisfy the condition of line 1. Said dif ferently, apart from messages (Vi, -, -, -) , only messages (V2 -I-Vi, cP2, -, -) sent by Byzantine processes can be in the set possible V otesp. Because honest processes can only update history at line 14 of Algorithm 1, no honest process has a pair (-, cP2 > cPi) in its history in the sending step of round r. It fo llows that onl y messages (Vi, -, -, -) can be in correctVotesp at line 2. Therefore, when a value Vi is locked, lines I and 2 prevent any value V -I-Vi or V = ? to be returned at lines 4 and 6. By (*) together with cPi > 0, condition of line 7 never holds in our example.
To understand the role of lines 8-11, we have to con sider another example. Let all honest processes have ini tially votep = Vi. With the same arguments as above, it fo llows that no value different from Vi or null can be re turned at lines 4 and 6. However, the condition of line 7 might hold. In this case, f1';, contains more than n -TD messages (Vi, 0, -, -) from honest processes, and at most b messages (V2 -I-Vi,O,-,-) from Byzantine processes. Because TD � n -b -f, we have n -TD � b, and Vi is returned at line 9. In other words, line 9 ensures FLV agreement when unanimity is considered.
Let us now discuss FLV-liveness. For this property to hold, we need a stronger variant of Selector-validity :
This requirements can be explained as fo llows. Let f1';, contains the messages from all the n -b -f correct pro cesses. There are two cases to consider: (1) correct pro cesses sent only (-,0, -, -) , (2) at least one correct pro cess sent ( -, ts > 0, -,-). Note that TD > 2b+f ensures n -b -f > n -TD + b (*). In case (I), by (*) the condi tion of line 7 holds, and null cannot be returned at line 13.
In case (2), let v denote the subset of messages in f1';, that are from correct processes, and let ts" be the highest times tamp in v. By Lemma 2 and Algorithm I, there is a unique value v" such that (v", ts", -, -) E v. To gether with (*), In the benign fault model, it is sufficient that the Selector function always returns a single process rather than a set of processes. One such instantiation of the Selector func tion is the well known rotating coordinator function used in [5] . Another example is the leader election function used in [II] .
Instantiation examples
In this section we show several well-known consen sus algorithms obtained from Algorithm 1. Note that be cause the instantiated algorithms are expressed in the round model, some details of the original algorithms (retransmis sion rules, leader election, message acceptance policies, etc.) are hidden.
Class 1 -OneThirdRule and FaB Paxos
OneThirdRule [6] The OneThirdRule algorithm, which assumes benign faults only, is obtained from Algorithm 1
with the fo llowing parametrization: T D = i 2 n t 1 l ,12 FLAG = *, Selector(p, cP) returning always II and Algo rithm 2 with TD = i 2 n iil as a FLV instantiation. It can be noticed that the instantiation leads to a (small) improve ment of the original OneThirdRule algorithm. Details can be found in [19] .
12 TD is chosen such that the same number of messages allow the con dition at line 31 of Algorithm I and the condition at line 4 of Algorithm 2 to hold. based implementation of the P cons predicate, based on signed messages [17] . By using the coordinator-free and signature-free implementation of P cons [2] , we can obtain coordinator-free and signature-free variant of FaB Paxos. We discuss Paxos as part of class 3 (rather than as part of class 2) to show the similarities between Paxos and PBFT, namely that the selection round for Paxos and PBFT are de rived from the FLV function for class 3. Paxos and PBFT are algorithms that solves a sequence of instances of con sensus (state machine replication). We consider here the in stantiation of a single instance of consensus that represents the "core" of these algorithms. Both algorithms incorporate the optimizations related to Selector(p, ¢) and validators mentioned in Section 3.1. With only benign faults, the instantiation of the function FLV can be simplified. We now explain how to get Al gorithm 6 from Algorithm 4. First, we can observe that any message (vote, ts, history) has the following property : ( vote, ts) E history. Therefore, the set correct V otesp is the same as the set possibleVotesp, which means that the set correctVotesp is not needed. It follows that history is not needed in the FLV function, and by extension, the variable historyp is not needed in the consensus algorithm.
Because the unanimity property is not relevant in the be nign case, lines 8-9 of Algorithm 4 can be removed. This allows us to merge lines 5-11 of Algorithm 4 into lines 4-5 of Algorithm 6.
PBFT [4] PBFT is designed for Byzantine faults (f = 0) and requires n > 3b. We get PBFT from Algorithm 1 with the fo llowing parametrization: TD = 2b + 1, FLAG = ¢, Selector(p, ¢) = II and Algorithm 7 as a FLV instantia tion. To get the instantiation as close as possible to PBFT, we have set n = 3b + 1, as in PBFT. We explain now how to get Algorithm 7 fr om Algo rithm 4. PBFT does not consider the unanimity property, which allows a significant simplification of Algorithm 4. Indeed, without the unanimity property, lines 8-9 of Al gorithm 4 can be removed. Then, we can merge the con ditions of line 5 and line 7 of Algorithm 4 into line 5 of Algorithm 7.
PBFT uses a coordinator-based implementation of P cons predicate that does not require signed messages [17] . By using the coordinator-free implementation of P cons [2] , we get a coordinator-free variant of PBFT.
Randomized consensus algorithms
Algorithm I can be adapted to support randomized con sensus algorithms. The first modification is the introduction of randomization. In the context of binary consensus (ini tial value 0 or I), line II is replaced with " select p := I or 0 with probability OS'. This allows all correct processes, by repeating the execution of the selection round, to select the same value with probability I.
A second modification is needed, which is related to the "reliable channel" assumption of these algorithms. This as sumption can be expressed by the following communication predicate that is required to hold in every round r instead of predicates P cons and P g oo d:
P rel (r) == I::/ p E C : I {m E Jl; : m i= ..l} I � n -b -f.
Therefore, randomized protocols need a slightly differ ent FLV-liveness property : for any set iI'; with n -b -f messages (instead of any set with all messages fr om correct processes), FLV must return a value different fr om null.
Note that Algorithms 2 and 3 ensure this property, but not Algorithm 4. In other words, we can easily transform any consensus algorithm of class I or 2 into a randomized al gorithm. We believe that this is not possible for consensus algorithms of class 3.
The instantiations of Ben-Or's binary consensus algo rithms [I] fr om Algorithm I can be found in [19] .
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Conclusion
The paper has presented a generic consensus algorithm parameterized with TD , FLAG, Selector and FLV . In stantiation of these parameters led us to distinguish three classes of consensus algorithms (into which known consen sus algorithms fit), and to identify the new MQB algorithm. As future work, we plan to develop a fr amework around our generic algorithm.
